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I. Introduction
On Christmas night and into the early morning hours of December
26, 1983, a freeze descended upon most of Florida's citrus groves.' The
most serious freeze damage was centered in the state's northern citrus
counties such as Marion, Lake and Orange.2 Southern portions of the
State were less affected by the cold temperatures. Farms from Dade to
Palm Beach counties suffered no freeze-related damage,3 however,
some portions of the southern-most citrus district, including the Indian
River production area,4 sustained below freezing temperatures with
some reported fruit icing.5 Subsequent to the cold spell, the Florida
Citrus Commission held an emergency meeting and public hearing on
December 29, 1983. The meeting resulted in an administrative order
which placed an embargo on all citrus fruit within the state.6 Except
1. Florida Agriculture Weather & Crop News, Dec. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 2. Dam-
age to citrus will occur when temperatures of 28 degrees Fahrenheit or below are sus-
tained for six hours or longer. Miami Herald, Dec. 26, 1983, at IA, col. 3. Another
hard freeze hit Florida's citrus belt during the morning of January 22, 1985, and au-
thorities feared the cold temperatures would damage citrus which escaped harm during
the Christmas freeze of 1983. The New York Times, Jan. 22, 1985, at 13, col. 1. On
January 24, 1985, the Florida Citrus Commission ordered a seven-day, state-wide em-
bargo to be followed by a fourteen-day ban on the shipment of any fruit showing signs
of spoilage. Miami Herald, Jan. 25, 1985, at 1A, col. 2.
2. Miami Herald, Dec. 27, 1983, at 6A, col. 2.
3. Miami Herald, Dec. 26, 1983, at 16A, col. 2.
4. Indian River County, as well as Brevard, St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach,
Broward, Dade and a portion of Volusia County comprise Citrus District Five. FLA.
STAT. § 601.09(5) (1983). However, the Indian River production area is not confined
to Indian River County. Its boundaries travel through several Florida counties, from
Volusia in the north to Palm Beach in the south. FLA. STAT. § 601.091(2) (1983).
5. Florida Agriculture Weather & Crop News, Dec. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
6. Florida Citrus Commission Order No. 0-83-16 (Dec. 29, 1983). Two years
earlier the Commission issued a similar embargo after a serious January freeze. New
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for citrus fruit used for processing purposes, the embargo banned the
preparation for market, sale or shipment of any Florida citrus for seven
days.7
Under Chapter 601, section 90(2)(a) of the Florida Citrus Code,8
York Times, Jan. 14, 1982, at 7D, col. 1.
7. Florida Citrus Commission Order No. 0-83-16 (Dec. 29, 1983).
8. FLA. STAT. § 601.90 (1983). The complete text of the statute follows:
(1) Whenever freezing temperatures of sufficient degree to cause seri-
ous damage to citrus fruit occur in any section of the citrus-producing ar-
eas of the state, the commission, upon call of the chairman and with such
notice as may be appropriate under the circumstances, shall meet within
96 hours of the last occurrence of such freezing temperatures to determine
whether or not such freezing temeperatures have caused damage to citrus
fruit as defined in s. 601.03 and, if so, the degree of such damage.
(2) If the commission, at such meeting, determines that serious dam-
age, as defined in § 601.89(1), has occurred to such citrus fruit, it may,
upon majority vote, enter an emergency embargo order providing for one
or more of the following:
(a) Prohibiting the preparation for market, sale, offering for sale, or
shipment of citrus fruit for a period not to exceed 10 days after com-
mencement of the embargo period.
(b) Prohibiting the sale, offering for sale, or shipment of any citrus
fruit showing "damage," as defined by § 601.89(2), for a period not to
exceed 14 days after commencement of the embargo period.
(c) Prohibiting the preparation for market, sale, offering for sale, or
shipment of citrus fruit for a period not to exceed 10 days after com-
mencement of the embargo period, and further prohibiting the sale, offer-
ing for sale, or shipment of citrus fruit showing "damage," as defined by §
601.89(2), for a subsequent period not to exceed 14 additional days.
(d) Prohibiting the sale, offering for sale, or shipment, in offshore ex-
port trade channels, of citrus fruit showing any degree of internal freeze-
related injury, as defined by § 601.89(3), for a period not to exceed 30
days from commencement of the embargo period.
(3) Any emergency order entered pursuant to this section shall be-
come effective upon adoption by the commission, the provisions of chapter
120 to the contrary notwithstanding, and shall have the full force and ef-
fect of law. The embargo period shall commence at a time established by
the commission in its order, but not sooner than 36 hours following adop-
tion of the order.
(4) Emergency embargo orders shall not be applicable to any citrus
fruit sold or transported to a citrus processing plant for processing pur-
poses or to any citrus fruit inspected, packed, and certified for shipment
prior to commencement of the embargo; however, any such citrus fruit not
shipped within 48 hours of commencement of the embargo shall be rein-
spected, on a random basis, and recertified as damage-free.
(5) Any order may provide for reasonably extended packinghouse in-
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the state Citrus Commission may issue an embargo order banning the
sale and transportation of all Florida citrus when fruit in any area of
the state has sustained serious damage as the result of freezing temper-
atures. The broad scope of this statute raises two constitutional issues
which form the basis of this note. The first question explores the sub-
stantive due process rights of certain citrus businessmen who are sub-
ject to the impact of an embargo. A second constitutional consideration
concerns the propriety of the legislature's delegation of power to the
Citrus Commission under the embargo statute. The statutes of two
other major citrus-producing states, California and Texas,9 afford very
different and less drastic approaches to citrus freezes. The quarantine
provision within Florida's Agricultural Code10 also represents a feasible
alternative to a state-wide embargo. Under the Florida Agricultural
Code's provisions, as with the California and Texas laws, no restrictions
on the movement of fruit may be issued unless the fruit is known or
suspected to be damaged or infested.1"
The Florida Citrus Code contains the embargo statute. The state
legislature enacted the Code as an exercise of its police power, to pro-
tect the health and welfare of those directly or indirectly involved in
the citrus industry and to protect the State's "major agricultural enter-
prise." 2 The Citrus Code recognizes the great public interest in the
spection hours prior to commencement of the embargo period.
9. CAL. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 3, R. 1430.98 (1983), TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §
71.002, 73.004 (Vernon 1984). While the Texas statute speaks of quarantines issued
against crop pests and diseases it is nevertheless applicable when a citrus freeze occurs.
See infra text accompanying note 121.
10. FLA. STAT. § 581.031(7) (1983).
11. Id.
12. FLA. STAT. § 601.02 (1983). The section details the purposes of the Citrus
Code as follows:
This chapter is passed:
(1) In the exercise of the police power to protect health and welfare
and to stabilize and protect the citrus industry of the state.
(2) Because the planting, growing, cultivating, spraying, pruning, and
fertilizing of citrus groves and the harvesting, hauling, processing, packing,
canning, and concentrating of the citrus crop produced thereon is the ma-
jor agricultural enterprise of Florida and, together with the sale and distri-
bution of said crop, affects of health, morals, and general economy of a
vast number of citizens of the state who are either directly or indirectly
dependent thereon for a livelihood, and said business is therefore of vast
public interest.
(3) Because it is wise, necessary, and expedient to protect and en-
hance the quality and reputation of Florida citrus fruit and the canned and
1984]
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industry and the necessity of protecting its reputation.'" The legislature
designed the Code to promote the general welfare of the citrus indus-
try, which in turn will benefit Florida's overall economy.' 4
Section 601.04 of the Citrus Code' 5 establishes the Citrus Com-
concentrated products thereof in domestic and foreign markets.
(4) To provide means whereby producers, packers, canners and con-
centrators of citrus fruit and the canned and concentrated products thereof
may secure prompt and efficient inspection and classification of grades of
citrus fruit and the canned and concentrated products thereof at reasona-
ble costs, it being hereby recognized that the standardization of the citrus
fruit industry of Florida by the proper grading and classification of citrus
fruit and the canned and concentrated products thereof by prompt and
efficient inspection under competent authority is beneficial alike to pro-
ducer, packer, shipper, canner, concentrator, carrier, receiver, and con-
sumer in that it furnishes them prima facie evidence of the quality and
condition of such products and informs the carrier and receiver of the
quality of the products carried and received by them and assures the ulti-
mate consumer of the quality of the products purchased.
(5) To stabilize the Florida citrus industry and to protect the public
against fraud, deception, and financial loss through unscrupulous practices
and haphazard methods in connection with the processing and marketing
of citrus fruit and the canned or concentrated products thereof.
(6) Because said act is designated to promote the general welfare of
the Florida citrus industry, which in turn will promote the general welfare
and social and political economy of the state.
13. FLA. STAT. § 601.02(3) (1983).
14. FLA. STAT. § 601.02(6) (1983).
15. FLA. STAT. § 601.04 (1983). The section details the selection and composi-
tion of the Commission:
(1)(a) There is hereby created and established within the Department
of Citrus a board to be known and designated as the "Florida Citrus Com-
mission" to be composed of 12 practical citrus fruit men who are resident
citizens of the state, each of whom is and has been actively engaged in
growing, growing and shipping, or growing and processing of citrus fruit in
the state for a period of at least 5 years immediately prior to his appoint-
ment to the said commission and has, during said period, derived a major
portion of his income therefrom or, during said time, has been the owner
of, member of, officer of, or paid employee of a corporation, firm, or part-
nership which has, during said time, derived the major portion of its in-
come from the growing, growing and shipping, or growing and processing
of citrus fruit.
(b) Seven members of said commission shall be designated as grower
members and shall be primarily engaged in the growing of citrus fruit as
an individual owner, or as the owner of, a member of, an officer of, or a
stockholder of a corporation, firm, or partnership primarily engaged in cit-
rus growing, and none of whom shall receive any compensation from any
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mission. The Commission is comprised of twelve governor-appointed
licensed citrus fruit dealer or handler, as defined in § 601.03, other than
gift fruit shippers, but any of said grower members shall not be disquali-
fied as a member if, individually, or as the owner of, a member of, an
officer of, or a stockholder of a corporation, firm, or partnership primarily
engaged in citrus growing which processes, packs, and markets its own
fruit and whose business is primarily not purchasing and handling fruit
grown by others, and one of said seven grower members shall be a resident
of and appointed from each of the seven citrus districts as defined in §
601.09. Five members of said commission shall be designated as grower-
handler members and shall be engaged as owners, or paid officers or em-
ployees of a corporation, firm, partnership, or other business unit engaged
in handling citrus fruit. Two of said five grower-handler members shall be
engaged in the fresh fruit business and three of the said five grower-han-
dler members shall be engaged in processing of citrus fruits. One of the
said five grower-handler members shall be appointed from Citrus District
No. 7 and the remaining four shall be appointed from the state at large
but of these four no two members shall be appointed from the same citrus
district.
(2)(a) The members of such commission shall possess the qualifica-
tions herein provided and shall be appointed by the Governor, subject to
confirmation by the Senate, for terms of 3 years each, and four members
shall be appointed each year. Such members shall serve until their respec-
tive successors are appointed and qualified. The regular terms shall begin
on June I and shall end on May 31 of the third year after such appoint-
ment. The members of the commission in office on July 1, 1969, shall con-
tinue to serve until the expiration of the present term of office. Beginning
with their successors, confirmation by the Senate shall be required for re-
moval from the commission.
(b) When appointments are made, the Governor shall publicly an-
nounce the actual classification and district, or state at large as the case
may be, that each appointee represents. A majority of the members of said
commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of all business
and the carrying out of the duties of said commission. Before entering
upon the discharge of their duties as members of said commission, each
member shall take and subscribe to the oath of office prescribed in § 5,
Art. II of the State Constitution. The qualification of each member as
herein required shall continue throughout the respective term of his office,
and in the event a member should, after appointment, fail to meet the
qualifications or classification which he possessed at the time of his ap-
pointment as above set forth, said member shall resign or be removed and
be replaced with a member possessing the proper qualifications and
classification.
(3) The commission is authorized to elect a chairman and vice chair-
man and such other officers as it may deem advisable. The chairman, sub-
ject to commission concurrence, may appoint such advisory committees or
1984]
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state residents who are involved in the citrus growing, packing and
processing industries. Seven of the members are "grower members," 16
each of whom represents one of the state's seven citrus districts. The
five remaining appointees are "grower-handler members."1 7 Two of
these five are involved in fresh fruit retailing and packing and the re-
maining three are citrus processors. 8 The Commission represents not
only each of the state citrus districts but also the interests of the vari-
ous aspects of the citrus industry.
When the Citrus Code was enacted in 1949, section 90 detailed
the power of the Commission in the event of a serious citrus freeze.' 9
The Commission was given the power to order a ban on the sale and
transportation of citrus for a period of not more than seven days. 0 Al-
though section 90 was considerably amended in 195921 and again in
1981,22 the power to ban the movement of all Florida citrus subsequent
to a serious freeze has remained intact during the thirty-six year his-
tory of the Code.
The 1981 amendment employed the term "embargo" for the first
time and represented a substantial change in the existing law.2" The
1959 text gave the Commission a choice between ordering a ten-day
ban on the movement of all state citrus, a fourteen-day ban on the
movement of freeze-damage fruit, or a combination of the two.24 The
1981 amendment makes an additional provision for fruit destined to be
sold in offshore trade channels.2 5 This provision bans the exportation of
councils composed of industry representatives as the chairman deems ap-
propriate, setting forth areas of committee or council concern.
16. FLA. STAT. § 601.04(1)(b) (1983).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 25149, § 90(2), 1949 Fla. Laws 280, 340.
20. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 25149, § 90(2)(a), 1949 Fla. Laws 280, 340.
21. The 1949 version of section 90 required the Commission to meet within sev-
enty-two hours of the freeze. Id. at 348. This was extended to ninety-six hours in the
1959 amendment. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 59-7, § 601.90(2), 1959 Fla. Laws 12. The
1959 amendment also extended the permissible length of the ban from seven to ten
days and further held that the order would become effective at a time "fixed" by the
Commission, compared to the twenty-four hour time limit set out in the original stat-
ute. Id. at 13.
22. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 81-97, § 601.90(2), 1981 Fla. Laws 177, 179.
23. Id. at 177.
24. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 59-7, § 601.90(2), 1959 Fla. Laws 12.
25. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 81-97, § 601.90(2)(d), 1981 Fla. Laws 177, 179.
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fruit showing any internal freeze damage for a period of thirty days.26
Further, the 1981 version of the law states that any emergency order
will become effective upon adoption by the Commission.2 7 But, while
the order is immediately effective, the embargo period may not com-
mence any sooner than thirty-six hours following the issuance of the
order by the Commission.28 Despite these changes in embargo options
and procedures, since its inception, the Citrus Commission has had
considerable power in the event of a citrus freeze. In such a situation
the Commission has been able to prohibit the sale and transportation
for sale of all citrus in the state when it determines that a freeze has
resulted in serious damage in any area of the citrus belt.29
In view of an embargo order's harsh impact on the citrus industry,
it is surprising that the constitutionality of section 601.90 has not been
challenged in the Florida courts. When an embargo is ordered pursuant
to section 601.90(2)(a), no Florida citrus may be prepared for market,
sold, offered for sale or shipped for the length of the embargo period."0
This prevents growers from picking fruit and transporting it to packing
houses. In turn, packing houses and retail outlets may not sell any fruit
other than the fruit brought in and inspected before the embargo goes
into effect. Grove owners whose entire crop escapes freeze damage, as
well as the packing houses and retail outlets which primarily rely on
these groves are subject to the effects of an embargo no less than those
whose fruit has sustained serious freeze damage. The harshness of an
embargo is somewhat mimimized by the thirty-six hours which must
pass between the issuance of the order and the commencement of the
embargo. That time may be used to harvest quality fruit and forward it
to packing houses. After Department of Citrus inspectors certify this
harvested fruit, it may be shipped forty-eight hours into the embargo
26. Id.
27. Florida Citrus Code, ch. 81-97, § 601.90(3), 1981 Fla. Laws 177, 179.
28. Id. The immediate effectiveness of an emergency order prevents interested
parties from seeking a hearing or judicial review. The statute itself notes that the reme-
dies provided by Florida's Administrative Code, chapter 120, which include hearings
and review by the courts, are not available in the face of an embargo. The non-access
of these remedies to those who are adversely affected by a Commission order may
present a question as to whether those parties are being deprived of their rights to
procedural due process. However, that issue is beyond the scope of this note.
29. 1949 Florida Citrus Code, ch. 25149, § 90(2)(a), Fla. Laws 280, 348; ch. 59-
7, § 601.90(2)(a), 1959 Fla. Laws 12; ch. 81-97, § 601.90(2)(a), 1981 Fla. Laws 177,
179.
30. FLA. STAT. § 601.90(2)(a) (1983).
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period."' But even with this provision, for the remainder of the embargo
period the citrus industry, with the exception of processors, is at a vir-
tual standstill.
After considering the effects of an embargo, a number of constitu-
tional questions may be raised. The remainder of this note will address
two specific constitutional issues and will ultimately suggest an alterna-
tive to the present statute. It appears that an emergency embargo or-
der, pursuant to section 601.90(2)(a), is a violation of the substantive
due process rights of those in the citrus industry whose fruit or major
sources of fruit remain damage-free after a serious freeze. Further, the
delegation of power by the Florida legislature to the Citrus Commis-
sion in section 601.90 is inadequately defined and not sufficiently lim-
ited in scope, resulting in a failure to protect against unfair and arbi-
trary application. Both the Florida Constitution and state caselaw
forbid such a delegation of power.32
II. Constitutional Questions Raised by Section 601.90(2)(a)
The Florida embargo statute has not yet been constitutionally
challenged in Florida courts. Nevertheless, there is ample Florida case
law available which may be used to examine the judicial standards em-
ployed to determine whether there has been either a due process viola-
tion or an improper delegation of legislative power. This case law in-
cludes Florida Supreme Court decisions pertaining to alleged
constitutional violations resulting from the administration of plant con-
trol and Citrus Code statutes. None of the laws challenged in these
cases called for a state-wide embargo, as does section 601.90(2)(a);
however, the issues raised by these controversies are analogous to the
constitutional questions presented in this note.
A. Substantive Due Process
Both the federal and Florida constitutions afford an individual a
guarantee against deprivation of rights without due process of law." It
is well-settled that the dictates of the due process clause are satisfied if
31. FLA. STAT. § 601.90(4) (1983).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 84-88.
33. "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law .. ", U.S. CONST. amend. xiv, § 1. The Florida Constitution
states, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law .. " FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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there is no unauthorized or arbitrary exercise of government powers. 34
The requirement of substantive due process forbids a state from depriv-
ing a person of life, liberty or property by any act which fails to bear a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate government purpose.
3 5
Before one can claim that his or her rights to due process are
threatened, it must be demonstrated that a legitimate liberty or prop-
erty interest exists.36 Citrus operators who are subject to a state-wide
embargo clearly suffer an interference with their business operations at
the hand of a government agency, since they are forced to curtail the
sale and transportation of fruit for possibly as long as ten days. It has
been variously held that the right to pursue a legitimate occupation is a
property right37 and therefore aggrieved people within the citrus indus-
try meet the first hurdle necessary to successfully allege a violation of
due process.
Once it has been ascertained that a right guaranteed under the
due process clause has been affected, further inquiry must be made to
determine whether it is a fundamental right, since if no fundamental
right is involved in the controversy a much less rigorous standard of
review is employed. 38 In the case of Sotto v. Wainwright39 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit furnished a list of funda-
mental rights, including the right to vote, to associate, to have free ac-
cess to the courts and "assorted freedoms against state intrusion into
34. Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Nat'l Bank of Liberty, 207 U.S. 251
(1907), relied on in Adams v. American Agricultural Chemical Co., 78 Fla. 362, 82
So. 850 (1919) and Davis v. Fla. Power Co., 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759 (1913).
35. State ex rel. Furman v. Searcy, 225 So. 2d 430, 433 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1969).
36. Thurston v. Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264, 1271 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated on other
grounds, 438 U.S. 901 (1978). It should be mentioned that while many of the parties
who are adversely affected by an embargo order may be corporations, it is settled law
that a corporate concern is a person for the purposes of a due process challenge. See
Dutton Phosphate Co. v. Priest, 67 Fla. 370, 65 So. 282 (1914); State v. Atlantic Coast
Line Ry. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908); Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So. 2d 605 (Fla.
1956), holding this principle is true at least where property rights are concerned.
37. See generally State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394 (1936);
State ex rel. Davis v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 122 So. 225 (1929); Paramount Enterprises v.
Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328 (1932); Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong,
300 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1974).
38. Ferrara v. Handry County School Bd., 362 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978). Courts employ a reasonable relationship test when no fundamental right is
involved, see infra text accompanying note 43.
39. 601 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1979).
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family life and intimate personal decisions."4 Further, an early Florida
case declared that under both the Florida and federal constitutions the
right to pursue a legitimate occupation is also a fundamental right.4 ' If
it is alleged that a state regulation has infringed on a fundamental
right, the state must demonstrate a compelling interest in order to sus-
tain the regulation. 42 Although the right to pursue an occupation is ap-
parently a fundamental right, a state-wide citrus embargo does not pre-
vent citrus operators from pursuing their livelihoods. Rather, the due
process problem which arguably stems from the application of a freeze
embargo takes the form of an unreasonable interference with the pur-
suit of an occupation, which, as noted earlier, is an infringement of a
property right.43 Therefore, the compelling state interest standard is
admittedly not applicable to the problem faced by the citrus business-
people due to section 601.90.
When a right other than a fundamental one is the subject of an
alleged due process violation under the Florida Constitution, a court
will employ a reasonable relationship test in order to determine if the
state action is arbitrary.44 Under this standard of review the regulation
of a trade or business will be upheld if it bears any reasonable relation-
ship to a legitimate government purpose and is not arbitrary or dis-
criminatory. More recently, Florida courts have employed a balancing
of interests test to aid in due process decisions.46 Under this approach,
in order to determine if a state regulation offends one's rights to due
process a court must weigh the need for the protection of individual
guaranteed rights against the state's interest in promoting the public
welfare.46 After balancing the respective interests of the parties, the
40. See id. at 191.
41. State ex rel. Hosack v. Yocum, 136 Fla. 246, 251, 186 So. 448, 451 (1939).
42. Sotto v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 184, 191 (5th Cir. 1979).
43. See supra text accompanying note 36.
44. Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Bd., 134 Fla. 1,
183 So. 759 (1938). See also Heller v. Abess, 134 Fla. 610, 184 So. 122 (1938) (hold-
ing courts may not void a regulation as violative of due process if there is any conceiva-
ble, reasonable basis for that regulation); Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So.
2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (stating that the test to be employed is whether a statute bears a
reasonable relationship to a state goal). See also Johns v. May, 402 So. 2d 1166 (Fla.
1981); United Yacht Brokers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 377 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1979); Belk-
James, Inc. v. Nuzum, 358 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1978).
45. Hadley v. Dep't of Admin., 411 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1982) (recognizing there is
no simple unchanging test to apply in due process controversies). See also City of
Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1978).
46. Hadley v. Dep't of Admin., 411 So. 2d 184, 188 (Fla. 1982).
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court must decide which interests weigh heaviest in the balance.4 7
It is clear that the Florida Constitution's broad prohibition of state
actions which deprive an individual of guaranteed rights is not meant
to hinder Florida in the exercise of its police power.48 However, any
exercise of that power must be designed to promote public health,
safety and morals49 and if a regulation fails to bear any reasonable
relationship to the proper ends of the police power, it will be held to
violate the due process clause.50 This failure to comply with the com-
mand of Florida's Constitution may be shown if an individual can
demonstrate that the application of a police power regulation is arbi-
trary and unreasonable.5 "
It is clear that the principles of due process apply to all govern-
ment officers and agencies to whom power or authority is delegated. 2
Therefore, a state agency such as the Citrus Commission is bound to
comply with those principles. Since a primary purpose of the Citrus
Code is "to protect health and welfare and to stabilize and protect the
citrus industry of the state,"53 the embargo statute is at least facially
valid. However, this does not preclude the possibility that the statute
may be unconstitutional as applied to certain individuals.54
Four Florida cases dealing with due process challenges against
plant control and citrus regulations not only help to illustrate how the
reasonable relationship standard is implemented, but also support the
thesis that there are due process problems in the application of an em-
bargo under section 601.90(2)(a). In State ex rel. Wolyn v. Apalachi-
cola Northern R.R. Co.,5 the Florida Supreme Court held that a Flor-
ida Plant Board order "must be based upon facts sufficient to support
it. .. " in order for it to be valid. 56 The Plant Board had ordered a
47. Id.
48. State ex rel. Pennington v. Quigg, 94 Fla. 1056, 114 So. 859 (1927); Scar-
borough v. Newsome, 150 Fla. 220, 7 So. 2d 321 (1942); Powell v. State, 345 So. 2d
724 (Fla. 1977).
49. Kass v. Lewin, 104 So. 2d 572, 578 (Fla. 1958).
50. Conner v. Cone, 235 So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. 1970).
51. L. Maxcy Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121 (1939). See also Graham
v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
52. State ex rel. Lawson v. Woodruff, 134 Fla. 437, 184 So. 81 (1938); Williams
v. Kelly, 133 Fla. 244, 182 So. 881 (1938).
53. FLA. STAT. § 601.02(1) (1983).
54. See supra note 50.
55. 81 Fla. 383, 87 So. 909 (1921).
56. Id. at 392, 87 So. at 912.
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quarantine prohibitng the shipment of sugar cane in a number of Flor-
ida counties where it was determined that the cane was likely to be
infected with Mosaic disease.57 The plaintiff sought to ship Japanese
cane, a variety known to be immune from the disease, from one of the
quarantined counties. 58 Without ruling on the constitutionality of the
quarantine statute, the court held that, since plaintiff's cane posed no
threat, no proper basis existed for the quarantine order.59 The shipment
was allowed. Wolyn, a 1921 case, clearly shows that quarantine orders
are inapplicable against crops that are free of pests or pose no threat of
infestation, since in such a situation the order bears no reasonable rela-
tionship to a legitimate state purpose. An extension of this reasoning
suggests that an embargo order which is issued pursuant to a severe
freeze should not be applied against undamaged citrus.
In L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 0 a Florida law banning any arsenic
spraying of citrus was held a valid exercise of the police power. The
plaintiffs alleged the regulation was arbitrary and unreasonable since it
was possible that moderate use of arsenic was not harmful to citrus"'
and, therefore, a total ban was unfair. The court noted that the use of
arsenic did not change the appearance of the fruit, but affected its inte-
rior quality. This tended to defraud consumers and in turn injure the
reputation of Florida citrus.6' The difficulty in facially recognizing cit-
rus treated with arsenic led the Florida Supreme Court to uphold the
regulation. The court noted that in cases where an "evil tendency" can-
not be easily distinguished, the legislature may impose regulations
which prohibit innocent activity, "as a means of insuring a statute's
effectiveness against the dominant evil of acts of that same general
class regardless of degree." 3 In applying a reasonable relationship
standard, the Maxcy court was able to find that the no-arsenic statute
promoted the general welfare. Further, even as applied to individuals
who were using arsenic in safe doses, the Florida Supreme Court sus-
tained the regulation because of the difficulty inherent in recognizing
57. Id. at 386-7, 87 So. at 910. Mosaic disease is an insect-vectored virus of
sugarcane which causes stunting and death of the plant. It can be spread by insects.
Telephone interview with Peter D. Spyke, M.S., St. Lucie County Extension Agent
(Nov. 28, 1984).
58. 81 Fla. at 385, 87 So. at 909-10.
59. Id. at 393, 87 So. at 912.
60. 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121 (1932).
61. Id. at 574, 139 So. at 130.
62. Id. at 572, 139 So. at 129.
63. Id.
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citrus that was improperly treated.64 Arguably, however, there is no
similar problem when a citrus freeze occurs, for two reasons: first, dam-
age will be known to occur if cold weather remains for a specified
length of time, and second, inspection will readily determine if fruit is
harmed. Therefore, the Maxcy reasoning, based on an inherent identifi-
cation problem, is not applicable when considering the Florida embargo
law.
In Corneal v. State Plant Board,6 5 a regulation resulted in the de-
struction of healthy as well as infected citrus trees. It was held that
grove owners must be compensated for the destruction of their
uninfected trees.66 Noting that the police power may be broadly em-
ployed, the Florida Supreme Court stressed that even the police power
is subject to "constitutional limitations, and it cannot properly be exer-
cised beyond such reasonable interferences with the liberty of action of
individuals as are really necessary to preserve and protect the public
health, safety and welfare. ' 67 The court approved the Plant Board's
treatment program aimed at eradicating the burrowing nematode 68 in
citrus groves, and further held that infected trees could be pulled and
burned.69 However, the destruction of healthy trees in close proximity
to those found to be diseased robbed grove owners of profits and ex-
ceeded the proper limits of the police power.70
Corneal's holding rests in part on the concept of eminent domain.
The Court stated that "the compulsory program requires the destruc-
tion of one owner's healthy trees for the purpose of protecting the
healthy trees of his neighbors. '71 While a citrus embargo order fails to
destroy property of unaffected grove owners to the extent it constitutes
a taking without compensation, 2 it nevertheless infringes upon the
64. Id. at 575, 139 So. at 130. The court suggested that in order to monitor a
mere regulation of arsenic spraying the state would require "an army of enforcement
officers" to administer the law. Id.
65. 95 So. 2d I (Fla. 1957), modified, 101 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1958).
66. Id. at 6-7.
67. Id. at 4. The plaintiff in this case attacked the Plant Board order under both
the Florida and federal constitutions. Id.
68. The burrowing nematode, Radolophus similis, is a worm which attacks the
roots of citrus trees and is the only mobile nematode. Potential damage is greater due
to the fact that a localized infestation may spread. Telephone interview with Peter D.
Spyke, M.S., St. Lucie County Extension Agent (Nov. 28, 1984).
69. 95 So. 2d at 6.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. "No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full
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property rights of those in the citrus business. Also, an embargo order
has at least a temporary effect on profits since no sale of citrus may be
made for the duration of the order. There is, therefore, some similarity
between the unfair effects of the tree destruction in Corneal and an
embargo which halts the business operations of citrus operators in pos-
session of undamaged fruit. Since the Corneal court felt that the de-
struction of healthy trees was not reasonably related to the general wel-
fare, it may arguably follow that an embargo order which prohibits the
movement of undamaged, quality citrus would likewise be held
impermissible.
More recently, in Flake v. Department of Agriculture,73 Florida's
Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a Florida quarantine order was
constitutionally valid since the order constituted a precautionary mea-
sure. The plaintiffs, Mr. Flake and others, had illegally imported a new
strain of citrus from Texas which was susceptible to foot rot74 and a
ringspot virus.7 5 One of the plaintiff's trees was subsequently found to
be infected with ringspot and the quarantine order was issued.7e The
court held "[i]n enacting regulatory measures which protect but do not
destroy property, the law need not restrict itself to conditions actually
harmful but may require precautions within the whole range of possible
dangers. . . .,,' This reasoning might lead one to view an embargo
order as a precaution and therefore within the ambit of the police
power. However, Flake's trees were known to be infected with a plant
disease, which rendered the quarantine reasonably related to the police
power since there was a legitimate concern that other trees would be-
come diseased. Again, an argument may be made that no such reasona-
ble relationship exists when an embargo affects grove owners and re-
tailers dealing in undamaged fruit since the Florida citrus industry is
compensation. . . ." FLA. CONST. art. x, § 6. An interesting argument may be made
that an embargo effectuates a temporary taking of property. Such a discussion is be-
yond the scope of this note.
73. 383 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
74. Foot rot, Phytophthora parasitica, is a fungus disease which occurs naturally
in the soil. It attacks the stems, roots and fruit of citrus, causing root rot, girdling of
the trunk and decay of fruit on the tree. Telephone interview with Peter D. Spyke,
M.S., St. Lucie County Extension Agent (Nov. 28, 1984).
75. The Necrotic Ringspot Virus is not known in Florida. It causes lesions, stunt-
ing, and in some cases, death of the tree. Telephone interview with Peter D. Spyke,
M.S., St. Lucie County Extension Agent (Nov. 28, 1984).
76. 383 So. 2d at 287.
77. Id. at 289 quoting Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1 (1957).
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not threatened by the sale or transportation of quality citrus.
In all of the foregoing cases, only plants or crops which were dis-
eased, susceptible to disease, or of a nature where contamination was
difficult to ascertain were allowed to be regulated under the police
power. This case law arguably strengthens a due process argument
aimed at section 601.90(2)(a). In addition, none of these cases applied
the balancing of interests test.7 8 If the test is applied to a hypothetical
situation where an embargo has virtually shut down a citrus retailing
operation for two weeks, additional problems with the constitutionality
of the embargo law become apparent. Initially, the balance would seem
to weigh heavily on the side of the state's interest in protecting those in
the citrus industry and the reputation of Florida fruit. In 1915, the
Supreme Court of the United States recognized that citrus is "one of
the great industries of the state of Florida 7 9 and that its reputation is
in need of protection in foreign markets." More recently it has been
held that the citrus business is of such import to state welfare that the
police power may be used to safeguard the industry. 1 If this interest is
being weighed against the property rights of a citrus operator whose
fruit is freeze-damaged, the embargo statute would certainly prevail,
since the sale of such fruit would injure the reputation of Florida fruit.
However, if the property rights subject to this hypothetical balance are
those of a retailer in possession of only quality fruit, the balance argua-
bly shifts. When the retailer is allowed to continue to sell this undam-
aged fruit, the purposes of the Citrus Code are well-served since the
retailer's business to some degree enhances the reputation of Florida
citrus and helps the economy of the state. When an embargo forces a
retailer in possession of quality citrus, and others in a similar situation,
to refrain from selling or transporting fruit, the purposes behind the
Citrus Code are frustrated since the nation is kept from consuming un-
damaged Florida fruit. Furthermore, the publicity of the state-wide
ban likely has a negative impact on out-of-state consumers. Under the
balancing of interests standard, the retailer should prevail, not simply
because of a desire to protect individual rights that are in no way af-
fected by the exigencies of a citrus freeze, but also because of a recog-
nition that this result is better for the state's welfare. As the balance
tips in favor of individual citrus businessmen, one may arguably sug-
78. See supra text accompanying note 44.
79. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 61 (1915).
80. Id.
81. Dep't of Citrus v. Griffin, 239 So. 2d 577, 578 (Fla. 1970).
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gest that the application of section 601.90(2)(a) in such a hypothetical
situation bears no reasonable relationship to the purposes which under-
lie the Citrus Code.
This hypothetical situation represents what actually resulted from
the embargo order of December 29, 1983. The suggested due process
flaw within section 601.90 takes on greater proportions when one is
reminded that people involved in the citrus industry throughout several
counties were forced to comply with a state-wide embargo order despite
the fact their fruit escaped any freeze damage. This potential due pro-
cess problem affected more than a few isolated businesses; it forced all
citrus operators throughout the southern portion of the State, except
for processing plants and their suppliers, to halt the sale and transpor-
tation of citrus for the duration of the embargo period. s2
B. Delegation of Power
The Florida Constitution expressly provides for the creation of cer-
tain administrative agencies,83 but the Citrus Commission does not fall
within this category. It is well settled, however, that legislative creation
of administrative agencies is compatible with the Florida Constitu-
tion.84 The Florida legislature provided for the creation of the Citrus
Commission in section 601.04 of the Florida Citrus Code of 1949.5
The Commission is an administrative board within the Department of
Citrus 6 and its creation is a valid legislative act.87 In addition to creat-
82. The contribution of the counties in the southern portion of the citrus belt is
not insignificant. For example, in January, 1983, the total shipments of state citrus
numbered 8,157,560 4/5 bushel boxes. This was during a peak citrus shipping month
in a year without a citrus freeze. Of that total, the southern citrus counties of Broward,
Palm Beach, Martin and St. Lucie contributed 1,319, 639 4/5 bushel boxes. FLA. Divi-
SION OF FRUIT & VEGETABLE INSPECTION ANN. REP. 30 (1982-3).
83. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(c) (creation of Parole Commission); art. IV, § 6(b)
(boards to grant and revoke occupational licenses); art. IV, § 9 (Game and Fresh
Water Commission).
84. Storrs v. Pensacola & A.R., 29 Fla. 617, 11 So. 226 (1982), for example,
upheld the constitutionality of the Railroad Commission Act, which authorized railroad
commissioners within the state to fix fair passenger and freight rates.
85. See supra note 15.
86. FLA. STAT. § 601.04(1)(a) (1983).
87. See supra note 80. See also Richardson v. Baldwin, 124 Fla. 233, 168 So.
255 (1936) (the state may authorize laws to protect agricultural industries and may
confer authority on administrative agencies to make rules and regulations to enforce
those laws); State ex rel. Davis v. Fowler, 94 Fla. 752, 114 So. 435 (1927); Milk
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ing an administrative agency, the legislature may confer upon an
agency the right to exercise the state police power."8 But while the leg-
islature may empower an administrative body to make determinations
in accord with its policy in a certain area, this type of delegation is
limited by article III, section 1 of the Florida Constitution. 9 Any stat-
ute which creates or grants power to an administrative agency is pre-
sumptively constitutional,90 but whenever the legislature delegates dis-
cretionary authority to an administrative agency, it must guide the
agency with standards and policy.91 These standards must be sufficient
to preclude the agency from exercising arbitrary power.92
It follows that in order to make an argument that section 601.90
represents an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, one must
ask three questions: 1) whether section 601.90 grants power to an ad-
ministrative agency; 2) if section 601.90 grants such power, whether
the Code furnishes that agency with standards to guide it in the exer-
cise of its power; and 3) if these standards exist, whether they suffice to
prevent an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the administrative
body.
The title of the embargo statute, "Freeze-damaged citrus fruit;
power of commission," may easily answer the first question. The text of
the section93 specifically details the extent of the power, which includes
the authority to enter an emergency embargo order. An affirmative an-
swer also exists for the second question, since the section does give the
Commission standards to follow in considering whether an embargo
should be issued. Particularly, the Commission must determine that se-
Comm'n v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 145 Fla. 579, 200 So. 83 (1940).
88. Bailey v. Van Pelt, 78 Fla. 337, 82 So. 789 (1919); Fla. Canners Ass'n v.
State Dep't of Citrus, 371 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), affd, 406 So. 2d
1079 (1981); Coca-Cola Co. v. State Dep't of Citrus, 406 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1981),
appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 1002 (1982). The Citrus Code specifically states it is en-
acted "[iun the exercise of the police power. . . ." FLA. STAT. § 601.02(1) (1983).
89. FLA. CONST. art III, § I states in pertinent part, "The legislative power of
the state shall be vested in a legislature of the State of Florida. .. ."
90. State ex rel. Atlantic C.L.R. Co. v. State Board of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592,
94 So. 681 (1922).
91. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, 74 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1954).
92. Barrow v. Holland, 125 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1960). "An agency of government
having the power to regulate is not permitted to arrogate to itself or to delegate to its
employees the arbitrary power to determine private rights with an unbridled discre-
tion." Id. at 752. See also Delta Truck Brokers, Inc. v. King, 142 So. 2d 273 (Fla.
1962).
93. See supra note 1.
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rious damage has occurred to citrus fruit before it may issue an emer-
gency order. The standard of serious damage is defined in the preced-
ing section.94 The final question is whether the guidelines provided in
section 601.90 as to "serious damage" 95 are sufficient to prevent the
Commission from exercising its power in an arbitrary manner. This
note has suggested that an embargo order fosters arbitrary and dis-
criminatory results when cold weather damages only a portion of the
state's citrus. In such a situation the order forces those with quality
fruit to curtail business activity. This activity, if allowed to continue
without interference, would actually promote the purposes of the Citrus
Code. The fact that such an unfair infringement of rights96 may result
when the Commission follows the present system indicates that the
94. FLA. STAT. § 601.89 (1983) provides:
(1) Citrus fruit shall be deemed "seriously" damaged by freezing
when such freezing causes:
(a) Marked dryness to extend into the segments of oranges and
grapefruit more than one-half inch at the stem end; or into segments of
mandarin or hybrid varieties more than one-fourth inch at the stem end; or
more than an equivalent amount by volume of dryness to occur in any
other portions of the fruit.
(b) Internal freeze-related injury, as defined in subsection (3), when
such condition or combinations of conditions is determined to affect the
fruit to a degree equal in seriousness to that described in paragraph (a).
(2) Citrus fruit shall be deemed "damaged" by freezing when such
freezing causes:
(a) Marked dryness to extend into the segments of oranges and
grapefruit more than one-quarter inch but less than one-half inch at the
stem end; or into segments of mandarin or hybrid varieties more than one-
eighth inch but less than one-fourth inch at the stem end; or more than an
equivalent amount by volume of dryness to occur in any other portions of
the fruit.
(b) Internal freeze-related injury, as defined in subsection (3), when
such condition or combinations of conditions is determined to affect the
fruit to a degree equal in seriousness to that described in paragraph (a).
(3) Internal freeze-related injury to citrus fruit, caused by freezing,
shall consist of any of the following:
(a) Wet cores or wet segment walls;
(b) Water soaking;
(c) Juice cell breakdown;
(d) Mushy condition;
(e) Honeycomb or open spaces in pulp; or
(f) Other evidence of internal breakdown, decay, or moldy condition.
95. FLA. STAT. 601.90(1) (1983).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
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standards currently set forth in section 601.90 are insufficient.
Several Florida cases recognize that sufficiently restrictive stan-
dards are required in a valid delegation of legislative power. In Mahon
v. County of Sarasota,9" the need for proper standards was emphasized
when an agency regulation prohibiting the accumulation of garbage
and vegetation was held invalid for failing to sufficiently limit the dis-
cretion of the county. A few years later, in Dickinson v. State,98 Flor-
ida's Supreme Court held that the legislative delegation of power to a
state agency for the purpose of administering the operation of cemeta-
ries was unconstitutional since it was not clearly defined and suffi-
ciently limited in scope. The court held that a delegation of power is
invalid if it fails to afford adequate protection against unfairness and
favoritism.99
Individuals alleging an over-broad delegation of power have also
attacked agriculture and citrus statutes. In Hutchins v. Mayo, °0  the
State Supreme Court held that, under the Florida Constitution, in or-
der to determine whether a statute unlawfully delegates legislative au-
thority, the test is "whether or not the act defines a pattern by which
the rule or regulation must be made to conform."'' In Hutchins, the
plaintiffs challenged a statute which gave the Citrus Commission the
power to fix various citrus standards and make regulations pertaining
to grading, stamping or certifying citrus fruit as well as the power to
collect assessments. The Hutchins court sustained the delegation of
power because the powers that were delegated to the Commission were
necessary to carry out the legislative policy of regulating the citrus in-
dustry. 0 12 An argument may be made that allowing the Citrus Com-
mission to order a state-wide ban on the sale and transportation of cit-
rus when only certain portions of the state have suffered freeze damage
falls short of fulfilling the purpose of the Citrus Code. As has been
suggested, such a ban actually hurts legislative policy.103
97. 177 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1965).
98. 227 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1969).
99. See id. at 37.
100. 143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495 (1940).
101. See id. at 496 (quoting Arnold v. State, 140 Fla. 610, 612, 190 So. 543, 544
(1939)). In this case, the pertinent portions of the Florida Constitution were article II,
dealing with division of powers and article III, § 1, which vests legislative power in the
state House of Representatives and the Senate.
102. See id. at 497.
103. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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In Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 04 a statute which allowed the Com-
missioner of Agriculture to assess on all individuals involved in the
sweet corn industry their pro-rata share of the expenses necessary to
fund its marketing orders was held invalid. The statute was fatally de-
fective since it failed to set any ceiling on the amount of money the
Commissioner could spend on marketing orders as well as the amount
which could be assessed against the individual members of the indus-
try.10 5 In Department of Citrus v. Griffin,'0 6 the Florida Supreme
Court held that in determining whether a legislative delegation of au-
thority is sufficiently restrictive, due consideration must be paid to "the
practical context of the problem sought to be remedied or the policy
sought to be effected."10 7 In Griffin, plaintiffs challenged the Orange
Stabilization Act, 08 which empowered the Department of Citrus to is-
sue marketing orders and to fund them through limited assessments on
boxed oranges. The Griffin plaintiffs also attacked a marketing order
that had been issued pursuant to the act. 09 Both the Act and the order
were upheld. The court noted that legislative delegation of power may
be permissible in situations where it is impractical for the legislature to
handle administrative matters on a year-round basis." 0 However, rely-
ing on Dickinson v. State"' the Florida Supreme Court held that even
when constantly changing conditions allowed a general scheme to be
delegated, statutes may not be "so general and unrestrictive that ad-
ministrators are left without standards for the guidance of their official
acts."" 2
Admittedly, it may be impractical for the legislature to deal di-
rectly with the exigencies of a citrus freeze. If this is so, Griffin would
appear to allow a general delegation of powers to an administrative
body such as the Citrus Commission. Nevertheless, Griffin would likely
demand that the empowering statute sufficiently limit the Commis-
104. 203 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1967).
105. See id. at 155. The portion of the Florida Constitution violated in this in-
stance of delegation was article IX, § 3, which states that "[n]o tax shall be levied
except in pursuance of law."
106. 239 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1970).
107. See id. at 580.
108. See id. at 578.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 580.
111. See supra note 94.
112. 239 So. 2d 577, 581 (Fla. 1970).
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sion's power. 113 Section 601.90 fails to state that the Commission may
order an embargo against only that citrus which shows serious damage.
It is this missing standard which renders the statute's validity question-
able. Without this guideline, the application of the embargo statute to
those who survive a freeze with quality fruit is unfair and
unreasonable.
Another provision of the statute indicates that power has been in-
sufficiently limited. Section 601.90 allows the Commission to choose
between four types of embargos."14 Each type of embargo may have an
impact on different people within the citrus industry. Further, the im-
pact may be felt for various lengths of time depending on the Commis-
sion's choice. However, even though each embargo may have different
results, the same single standard (that serious damage has occurred to
any citrus within the state) applies to all of the choices. Without any
further guide the Commission may use the fact that citrus in the north-
ern portion of the state has sustained serious damage to order a ban on
the sale and transportation of citrus in other, possibly unaffected, por-
tions of the state.
III. Alternatives to a State-wide Embargo and a Suggested
Approach
Upon consideration of the constitutional questions raised by the
existing freeze procedure, one must also consider alternatives to the
present embargo system. Statutes of two other major citrus-producing-
states, California and Texas, provide an illuminating study of more
flexible approaches to freeze emergencies. Florida may profit by using
these alternative approaches as sound guides toward a more acceptable
freeze procedure.
The State of California demands that its citrus be free from seri-
ous damage." 5 A detailed inspection program has been developed to
prevent damaged fruit from leaving the state. Once a freeze occurs,
citrus fruit is inspected by examining the segment walls of the fruit."'
This method of inspection continues until a survey provides additional
evidence of the extent of actual freeze damage, a point known as "date
113. Griffin states that "[e]ven where a general approach would be more practi-
cal than a detailed scheme of legislation," constitutional limitations exist. Id. at 581.
114. See supra note 1; FLA. STAT. § 601.90(2) (1983).
115. CAL. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 3, R.1430.89 (1983).
116. CAL. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 3, R.1430.92(a) (1983).
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A." 17 From date A forward, inspection may be made either by inspec-
tion of the segment walls or by a transverse cut through the center of
the fruit."' This double method of inspection remains in effect until it
is possible to make a reasonably precise determination of the full extent
of freeze damage."l 9 After this point, known as "date B,"120 inspection
is made by the transverse cut method.' 2' The determination that a cit-
rus freeze has triggered the drying process is based upon inspection of
fruit in only those areas of California where freeze damage has
occurred.12
2
The California approach focuses on inspection of fruit in areas hit
by a freeze, leaving those citrus producers in other areas free from in-
spection or any interference with their business. This procedure avoids
the constitutional problems faced by Florida's section 601.90. First, by
allowing those citrus operators who escape any freeze damage to con-
tinue to pursue their livelihood, there is no danger of an arbitrary dep-
rivation of property rights. This eliminates any violation of substantive
due process through application of the freeze statute. Second, there is a
valid delegation of power to the agricultural administrative body, since
the California law states that inspections shall be made only in areas of
the state which sustain freeze damage.'23 The statutes further detail
the methods of inspection for freeze-damaged fruit.'24 These precise
standards sufficiently limit the discretionary power of the officials so as
to prevent any arbitrary and unfair application of the law.
The Texas Agricultural Code provides another citrus freeze proce-
dure which is worthy of examination. The damage caused to citrus as
117. Id.
118. CAL. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 3, R.1430.92(c) (1983).
119. CAL. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 3, R.1430.92(b) (1983).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. CAL. ADMIN. CODE "T. 3, R.1430.98 (1983) states:
The determination by the Director of the Department of Food and Agri-
culture as required by Section 1430.92 of the California Administrative
Code, that the drying process resulting from freezing damage has been
developed (a) "to such extent as to furnish additional evidence of the ex-
tent of actual damage to the fruit" and (b) "to such extent as to permit
reasonably accurate determination of the full extent of freezing damage by
such examination, without regard to the damage on the segment walls,"
shall be based upon an investigation of the condition of orange fruits in the
areas of the State where freezing damage to oranges has occurred.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 112-117.
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the result of a freeze falls into the category of "Citrus fruit and storage
rot" on Texas' list of dangerous diseases and pests.125 The Department
of Agriculture may quarantine an infected area if it is determined that
one of these plant diseases exists within the state. 2 This quarantine
procedure deals with plant diseases which are not widely distributed in
the state.12 7 Texas also allows the Department of Agriculture to estab-
lish an emergency quarantine, without notice or public hearing, when a
public emergency exists.'28 While this type of quarantine may immedi-
ately extend to the state borders, it is unlikely to be used in the face of
a citrus freeze. Freeze damage occurs as the result of cold tempera-
tures, and damage may be readily predicted and discovered. Texas'
emergency quarantine is aimed at controlling the "introduction or dis-
semination of an insect pest or plant disease," 29 indicating it is chiefly
concerned with plant diseases which are of a spreading and uncertain
nature. Freeze damage does not fall into this category. Therefore, the
general quarantine provision of the Texas Agricultural Code 30 would
most likely be followed in the event of a citrus freeze.
The Texas quarantine, like the California inspection program, fo-
cuses a freeze procedure only on areas that are affected by the citrus
freeze.' 3' Therefore, the Texas approach protects the property of people
125. TEx. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 73.004(27) (Vernon 1982).
126. Tnx. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 71.002 (Vernon 1982) states:
"If the department determines that a dangerous insect pest or plant dis-
ease not widely distributed in this state exists within an area of the state,
the department shall quarantine the infested area."
127. Id.
128. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (Vernon 1982) provides:
(a) The department may establish an emergency quarantine without
notice and public hearing if the department determines that a public emer-
gency exists in which there is the likelihood of introduction or dissemina-
tion of an insect pest or plant disease that is dangerous to the interests of
horticulture and agriculture in this state.
(b) The department may establish the emergency quarantine at the
boundaries of the state or in other areas within the state.
(c) The emergency quarantine and rules adopted in order to prevent
the introduction or spread of the pest or disease are effective immediately
on establishment or adoption.
(d) An emergency quarantine expires 30 days following the date on
which it was established unless reestablished following notice and hearing
as provided by this subchapter.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 122.
131. Quarantines are established against "the infested area." TEX. AGRIC. CODE
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in the citrus business whose fruit is undamaged and also sufficiently
limits the Department of Agriculture's administrative power.
Florida, too, has a quarantine law. 132 The Plant Industry Division
of the Florida Department of Agriculture has the power to declare a
quarantine against an orange grove if plant pests are discovered."' The
statutory quarantine prohibits the movement, sale or other disposal of
any plant or plant product included in the quarantined area. 34 Orders
are issued "in reference to plant pests,' ' 3 5 indicating they must be pre-
mised on a plant-threatening situation. 36 This statute ensures that the
harsh effect of a quarantine only affects those plant growers and dis-
tributors whose property lies within the infested area.
Just as it is possible to determine the extent of pest infestation,
freeze damage may be ascertained by monitoring cold temperatures
and inspecting suspect fruit. Therefore, it is possible that Florida's
quarantine laws could be modified to expressly govern a citrus freeze
situation. However, this would result in placing the quarantine decision
in the hands of the Plant Industry Division, not the Citrus Commission.
Since the Commission fairly represents all the interests within the cit-
rus industry"17 it is best that that body retain power over citrus freeze
situations.
Arguably, the better alternative is to correct the problems within
section 601.90. The Commission should be authorized to order an em-
bargo against any area of the state which sustains citrus damage as the
result of a freeze. This would include both "serious damage" and
"damage" as defined by the Citrus Code." 8 The length of the embargo
should correspond to the length of time needed for the Department of
Citrus inspectors to ascertain the degree of citrus damage. Any fruit
showing damage to the extent that its sale would injure the reputation
of Florida citrus or pose a threat to the general welfare should be pro-
ANN. § 71.002 (Vernon 1982). Texas also allows the commissioners court of any
county to request that the department investigate the possibility of a plant pest or dis-
ease within the county. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 71.008 (Vernon 1982).
132. FLA. STAT. § 581.03(7) (1983).
133. Id.
134. FLA. STAT. § 581.101(1) (1983).
135. FLA. STAT. § 581.031(7) (1983).
136. A recent quarantine went into effect in the Greater Miami area on June 27,
1984, upon discovery of five adult Mediterranean fruit flies in the Little Havana neigh-
borhood. Miami Herald, June 27, 1984, at 4D, col. 1.
137. See supra note 15.
138. FLA. STAT. § 601.89 (1983).
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Florida's Citrus Freeze Embargo
hibited from further movement, unless that fruit is to be used for
processing purposes. 139 Under this system, quality fruit could continue
to be packed and sold, lessening the negative impact a state-wide ban
would have on consumers. 40 This negative consumer attitude is
thought to outlast the embargo period.' 4 ' South Florida citrus operators
who were unreasonably subject to the 1983 embargo felt that a state-
wide embargo ultimately resulted in consumer fear of Florida fruit. 42
This consumer fear has two causes: the absence of Florida citrus in the
marketplace for a period of time, and the long time needed for citrus
prices to stabilize. 43 The businessmen also expressed concern that the
after-effect of an embargo, perhaps more than its immediate impact,
hurts the industry. 44
The suggested revisions to section 601.90 would result in a freeze
procedure that would be technically different from the procedures fol-
lowed in either California or Texas, but would rid the current law of
the serious problems created by its application. A regional embargo
system would not interfere with business pursuits in an unreasonable or
arbitrary manner. Further, the suggested amendment to 601.90 would
limit the power of the Commission, preventing it from being used in an
unfair manner. The end result would well serve the two primary pur-
poses of the Citrus Code: to enhance the reputation of Florida citrus
and to promote the state's economy. A regional embargo would indi-
cate to national consumers that only part of Florida's citrus belt sus-
tained freeze damage. This would translate into more consumer confi-
dence when purchasing Florida citrus. Consumer confidence would
139. Under the proposed revision, § 601.901 would remain unaffected. This sec-
tion enables the Commission to establish the maximum permissible degree of freeze
damage in fruit to be used for processing. FLA. STAT. § 601.901 (1983).
140. At the emergency meeting on Dec. 29, 1983 which resulted in the embargo
order, four telephone messages were read from grove owners who escaped freeze dam-
age. All four were against the embargo. One caller specifically mentioned his concern
about negative media coverage. He felt widespread publicity about an embargo implies
to the country that Florida is without any fresh citrus whatsoever. Emergency Meeting
and Public Hearing of the Florida Citrus Commission, Dec. 29, 1983 at 6.
141. Id.
142. Emergency Meeting and Public Hearing of the Florida Citrus Commission,
Dec. 29, 1983 at 7.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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result in continued sales, ultimately benefiting all those directly and
indirectly concerned with Florida's greatest agricultural industry.
Nancy Perkins Spyke
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